Course One · Ten weeks

The Evolution of an Ownership Society

Going Back to Our Future

An Ownership Society — where every citizen may freely choose and own the fruits of their labor — is an evolutionarily stable socio-economic strategy, and the next mutation of democratic capitalism.

We build the case from the ground up: from the membrane that made the first property line, through Locke's natural rights, Darwin's selection, Nash's mathematics and Nowak's five rules of cooperation, to the ownership mechanisms that already work.

Engraved natural-history plate of a branching tree of life
Plate I — the branching record of what survived
10
Weeks of lecture
60
Leading messages
120
Plates in total
8
Primary sources
The ledger

Ten weeks, one argument

Each week is six leading messages, each followed by a supporting plate of diagrams, figures or chronology — and closes with the required reading and three questions to answer before next class.

Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Ch. 1–3View slides

Every life form protects and defends property: the gene is wrapped in DNA, DNA is walled in a nucleus, the cell is skinned by a membrane, and the family is housed. Ownership is not an invention of law; it is an instruction written into living matter.

Reading: The Selfish GeneRichard Dawkins · 6 message slides + 6 supporting plates

Locke, Second Treatise, Ch. 2–5View slides
Darwin, Origin, Ch. 3–4; Ryan, Darwin's Blind SpotView slides
Nash, Non-Cooperative Games (1951)View slides
Maynard Smith & Price on ESS; Nowak, SuperCooperators Ch. 1–2View slides
Nowak, SuperCooperators, Ch. 3–7View slides
Smith on the invisible hand; the founding essayView slides
The essay's compounding slides; Nowak Ch. 8View slides
Blasi, Freeman & Kruse, The Citizen's ShareView slides
The founding essay, read againView slides
A look inside

Week VI: The Five Rules of Cooperation

Use the arrow keys: → walks the deck, ↓ opens the supporting plate beneath any leading message.

Lecture hall · Week VI

The Five Rules of Cooperation

Plate 01 · leading message · use ← → keys

Plate 01

Cooperation is not a mood. It is an inequality.

B is the benefit to the recipient, C the cost to the performer. Cooperation spreads only when the ratio B/C clears a threshold set by the mechanism in play.

B / C > threshold

1 / 12
Slides
The mathematics of cooperation

Nowak's five rules — and what each one asks of policy

1Kin selection

B / C > 1 / R

We help those most closely related to us. R is the coefficient of relatedness — one half for a sibling, one quarter for a nephew.

Policy · Household savings, inheritance, family enterprise.

2Direct reciprocity

B / C > 1 / W

I scratch your back, you scratch mine. W is the probability of another round of engagement between the same two players.

Policy · Vesting equity, long contracts, tenure.

3Indirect reciprocity

B / C > 1 / Q

You help others in a community that values reputation. Q is the probability that another person knows your reputation.

Policy · Disclosure, audit, portable records.

4Spatial selection

B / C > K

You help those in closest proximity because your interests are shared. K is the average number of neighbours per person.

Policy · Local ownership, co-operatives, community capital.

5Group selection

B / C > 1 + N + M

Groups of cooperators outcompete groups of defectors. N is group size and M the number of groups in competition.

Policy · Broad-based employee ownership at national scale.

The library

Eight volumes, chosen with intent

Second Treatise of Government by John Locke
Vol. I · Weeks II, IX

Second Treatise of Government

John Locke

The source. Natural rights and the labor theory of property give every later claim its footing.

On the Origin of Species by Charles Darwin
Vol. II · Week III

On the Origin of Species

Charles Darwin

The engine. Scientific evidence for survival-of-the-fittest selection based strictly on genetic self-interest.

Non-Cooperative Games by John Nash
Vol. III · Weeks IV, V

Non-Cooperative Games

John Nash

The mathematics. A stable solution concept for rational players in tension — and the Prisoner's Dilemma it explains.

The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins
Vol. IV · Week I

The Selfish Gene

Richard Dawkins

The reframe. Selection moves from the organism to the replicator, and ownership becomes an instruction.

SuperCooperators by Martin Nowak
Vol. V · Weeks V, VI

SuperCooperators

Martin Nowak

The payoff. Five rules, each with a formula, explain when cooperation outcompetes the defector.

Darwin's Blind Spot by Frank Ryan
Vol. VI · Weeks I, III

Darwin's Blind Spot

Frank Ryan

The complement. Cells and animals do cooperate to survive — symbiosis is a creative engine of evolution.

The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith
Vol. VII · Week VII

The Wealth of Nations

Adam Smith

The economy. The invisible hand of enlightened self-interest — and the limits history revealed in it.

The Citizen's Share by Blasi, Freeman & Kruse
Vol. VIII · Weeks VIII, IX

The Citizen's Share

Blasi, Freeman & Kruse

The economics of ownership. Broad-based employee share ownership — the arrangement venture capital used to build great companies — enriched ordinary workers and outperformed the alternative.

See the full reading plan →
The founding essay

This course mirrors the introductory essay

Every week follows the sequence of the original post, “The Evolution of an Ownership Society: Going Back to Our Future,” by Walter Barry.

Read the essay at ownershipsociety.com →